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Indian labour politics today faces a historic 
paradox. On the one hand, in response to 
regressive changes to labour laws, India’s 
trade unions have continued to organise 
what is, after China, the world’s largest 
working-age population; on the other, 
massive labour protests have failed to make 
a dent in the political popularity of Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi and his right-wing 
Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party. 
To make sense of this apparent contradiction, 
this essay will outline the role of the Indian 
government in the formation of new labour 
law regulations since 2014, and the response 
of India’s trade unions to this new challenge.
Indian labour politics today faces a 
historic paradox. On the one hand, India’s 
vast labour movements have continued to 
organise what is, after China, the world’s 
largest working-age population and to 
mobilise record numbers of workers in 
national street protests in response to 
regressive changes to labour laws. On the 
other hand, several massive labour protests 
have failed to make a dent in the political 
popularity of Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi and his right-wing Hindu nationalist 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Since 2014, 
the BJP has dominated government at the 
national level and at the local level in 13 
states, including strategically-important 
and populous states like Uttar Pradesh and 
Maharashtra, as well as Rajasthan, Gujarat, 
and Haryana. 
To explain this paradox, we need to look 
at the historical legacy of India’s trade 
unions as well as the rise of the BJP, as part 
of a wider ‘family of organisations’ (Sangh 
Parivar), since the 1980s. Historically, the 
backbone of India’s labour movement has 
been in the public sector and organised 
sector, which refers to all non-agricultural 
enterprises with ten or more employees. 
Despite the appearance of political strength, 
India’s system of industrial relations never 
gave unions the right to collectively bargain 
with employers, and public sector wages 
and conditions were effectively fixed by 
the state. Unions were divided between 
competing federations—known as Central 
Trade Union Organisations (CTUOs)—each 
with different political party affiliations and 
most heavily reliant on political patronage. 
Therefore, when India’s economy 
stagnated and industrial conflict began 
to rise in the 1970s, the movement as a 
whole was poorly prepared to advance the 
interests of workers independently of state 
institutions or regional political classes. 
From that point onwards, the organised 
sector has declined as a proportion of total 
employment. The vast majority of new 
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jobs created in the 1980s and 1990s were 
in small firms in the unorganised sector, 
which refers to enterprises with fewer 
than ten workers. Even when organised 
sector employment began to grow again in 
the 2000s, recruitment was increasingly 
dominated by the precariously employed, 
such as workers hired by labour contractors.
 Despite the enormity of this challenge, 
the union movement grew significantly 
during the ‘neoliberal’ era of the 1990s 
and 2000s. Union membership doubled in 
India from 1989 to 2002, which is the last 
year the national government verified trade 
union numbers based on complete records 
from all states (John 2007; Government of 
India 2008). Although unverified by the 
state, the most recent data released by the 
12 officially-recognised CTUOs in 2012 and 
2013 suggest that total membership may 
have increased by three or even four times 
since 2002 (Menon 2012). Much of this 
increase has come from informal workers. 
It is on such a background that this essay 
will outline the role of BJP-led Governments 
at both national and regional levels in the 
formation of new labour law regulation since 
2014, and the response of India’s CTUOs to 
this new challenge.
Modi’s Labour Agenda
Labour law reform is a major part 
of Narendra Modi’s economic reform 
agenda, which is framed by the ‘Make 
in India’ initiative. This aims at making 
India the destination of choice for global 
manufacturing investment by continuing 
with previous governments’ generous 
subsidies for large corporations and 
promises to cut governmental ‘red tape’. 
Industrial conflict and union rights stand 
in the way of this dramatically ambitious 
agenda to challenge China’s domination of 
global manufacturing. 
Modi has expressed sympathy for 
reforms enacted by several BJP-led 
state governments in the areas of labour 
contractors and hire-and-fire flexibility. For 
example, the Governments of Rajasthan, 
Haryana, and Madhya Pradesh have made 
it easier for employers in organised sector 
firms to sack workers. This has been done 
by changing the rules established under the 
Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (IDA), making it 
possible for firms which employ 300 workers 
or more to make large-scale layoffs without 
state permission (previously the threshold 
was 100 workers). This change will be 
applied nationally if the Modi Government 
is able to pass its Labour Code, which aims 
to consolidate three central labour laws, 
including the IDA, into one simplified law. 
Although this code was introduced in April 
2015, its passage has been delayed by the 
slow pace of the Indian legislature and by 
opposition party control of the Rajya Sabha 
(upper house).
If passed, this Code would also extend 
the IDA’s restrictions on strike action. 
Currently, public sector employees must 
give two weeks advance notice for any 
strike. The proposed change would extend 
this restriction to all workers and impose 
fines of 20,000 to 50,000 rupees (about 300 
to 780 USD) and potential imprisonment 
for ‘illegal’ strike action (Gopalakrishnan 
and Sundar 2015). The Modi Government 
has also proposed changes to the Minimum 
Wage Act and the Apprenticeship Act, which 
would allow inter-state migrant workers to 
be hired as apprentices and sets their wages 
as a ‘stipend’ of 70 to 90 percent of the 
minimum wage, with no medical insurance.
While popular among industrialists, much 
of this mainstream labour law debate has 
focused on the small minority of regular 
workers employed in organised sector firms 
and does nothing to address the interests and 
rights of the majority of informal workers. 
Arguably, a more significant shift for 
informal workers involves proposed changes 
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to social security. The Modi Government 
has already dramatically wound back the 
National Rural Employment Guarantee, 
which, since its inception in 2005, was 
supposed to provide 100 days of manual 
waged work (albeit at sub-minimum wages) 
for rural households. Now the government 
is proposing to collapse all existing social 
security provisions into the new unified 
Labour Code. If implemented, this reform 
would consolidate 15 separate laws into a 
single labour law (Gopalakrishnan 2017).
This would have a potentially dramatic 
impact on the rights of millions of poor 
informal workers. For example, labour 
activists have made major breakthroughs in 
some regions by organising workers to access 
entitlements through tripartite (employer-
union-state) welfare boards. Many workers 
in informalised sectors, like construction or 
cigarette rolling, have benefited from death 
and accident insurance, maternity leave, 
education scholarships for their children, 
and funding for marriages. The new labour 
code threatens to undermine these hard-
won rights by severely undermining these 
welfare boards. 
’Bharat Bandh’
Since Modi’s election in 2014, unions—
led by the core of India’s CTUOs—have 
periodically mobilised in large numbers to 
oppose the government’s labour agenda. In 
September 2016, a massive nationwide strike 
caused major disruption to the economy. 
Some unions have claimed this was the 
largest general strike in history, with up 
to 150 million workers involved and costs 
to business of around 2.7 billion USD (Safi 
2016). While these figures are impossible to 
verify, the strike was highly significant with 
virtually all public sector units, banks, and 
electricity power stations closed, in addition 
to insurance companies and, in many 
regions, trains, bus services, and schools 
(Jagannathan 2016). Additionally, tens of 
thousands of coal miners joined the strike, 
along with university and college teachers 
(Live Mint 2016a; Reddy 2016). Many large 
private sector firms were also closed down 
or substantially affected. 
This Bharat Bandh—literally ‘India 
closed’ in Hindi/Sanskrit—was the result 
of coordinated action by ten CTUOs who 
promoted a 12-point charter of demands on 
the Modi government (Live Mint 2016b). 
These demands include calls to expand 
subsidised food schemes, enforce existing 
labour laws (including minimum wages), 
implement universal social security, end the 
privatisation of public sector units, and ban 
foreign investment in railways and defence 
(Industriall Global Union 2016). The same 
CTUOs had organised another national 
strike in September 2015, which attracted 
a similar number of participants (Australia 
Asia Worker Links 2015). In February 2013, 
tens of millions had also joined a national 
strike (Australia Asia Worker Links 2013). 
The scale of these successive protests 
demonstrates not only the sheer size of the 
Indian working class—the official labour 
force count is around 500 million, although 
the true figure is probably much larger—but 
also that CTUOs have been growing steadily 
in recent years. Still, in spite of these 
numbers and despite the BJP facing a new 
test in the Gujarat State elections at the time 
of writing, these protests have made little 
difference to Modi’s sustained popularity as 
a politician and to the success of the BJP in 
state elections. 
Explaining the Paradox
What explains the apparent contradiction 
between massive labour protests and a 
failure to change the direction of Indian 
politics? One reason is that India’s polity and 
civil society is extremely diverse and ‘labour 
politics’ represent just one relatively minor 
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part of it. Another is that labour politics 
tends to be squeezed outside mainstream 
debate by the country’s political and media 
elite, who are largely hostile to unions. 
A more fundamental reason relates to 
the BJP’s historical success in appealing 
to a range of classes and castes, which fall 
between India’s minority of industrialists 
and organised sector workers. As India’s 
economy liberalised in the 1980s and 1990s, 
the BJP often succeeded in appealing 
to the interests of these ‘intermediate 
classes’ within a populist framework, 
while continuing to support and facilitate 
neoliberal economic policies (McCartney 
2009). The BJP also appealed to the 
minority of salaried ‘middle class’ Indians in 
large cities—the well-educated, upwardly-
mobile sons and daughters of public 
sector employees and professionals who 
underpinned new markets for automobiles, 
electronic goods, and other trappings of 
consumer society. 
This electoral appeal intersected with 
the rise of an immense anti-corruption 
movement in 2011 and 2012, which related to 
Indians’ experience of everyday corruption. 
At the time, the movement severely 
undermined the Indian National Congress-
led national government. This confluence of 
factors meant that Modi, who cultivated an 
image as a ‘clean’, no-nonsense technocrat, 
was well positioned to take power in 2014, 
winning in a landslide. 
Beyond the Set-Piece
Interestingly, many of the most significant 
social struggles since 2014 have occurred 
outside the set-piece events orchestrated 
by CTUOs. In the auto industry, a strike by 
3,000 Honda workers in Tapukara in early 
2016, 100 kilometres southwest of New 
Delhi, was heavily repressed by the state 
BJP government (Workers Solidarity Centre 
2016). Over 1,000 workers were arrested, 
136 workers fired, and dozens jailed. This 
came after the most serious conflict in the 
auto industry to-date, at Maruti Suzuki 
India Limited (MSIL) in the nearby town 
of Manesar. This conflict in 2011 and 2012 
resulted in thousands of sackings, the tragic 
death of a human resources manager, and 
the imprisonment of dozens of workers. 
Another important strike in 2016 took 
place in Bengaluru (Bangalore) where up 
to 400,000 workers emptied the city’s 
garments factories and flooded the streets 
in response to government changes to state 
pensions (Bageshree and Bharadwaj 2016). 
Key features of this strike included its 
primarily ‘wildcat’ character—local CTUOs 
were taken by surprise, despite having 
organised their own, much smaller response 
to the changes—and that the strikers were 
overwhelmingly women. This massive 
protest succeeded in deferring the Modi 
government’s plans (Aanchal Magazine 
2016).
Given that women tend to work outside 
the male-dominated structures of most 
trade unions, another highly significant 
development occurred in the tea plantations 
of Munnar in Kerala in September 2015, 
when female plantation workers established 
a new women migrant-led union—Pembila 
Urumai (‘Unity of Women’ in Tamil)—to 
break with male-dominated unions (Banerji 
2016). 
While some of these workers may have 
participated in the CTUO-organised 
general strikes, the real challenges to the 
current polity have occurred in between 
these set-piece events, in a society in which 
the labour laws and social protections 
that have provoked such ferocious debate 
among industrialists, union federations, and 
political classes are so rarely applied. The 
Modi Government has signalled the intention 
to plough ahead with its controversial 
labour reform agenda, so further points of 
contention are likely to emerge.
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